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Impact of private health insurance on a public healthcare 
system: the case of cesarean deliveries 
 
Carine MILCENT‡  and Saad ZBIRI§  
 
 
Abstract 
According to the health economics literature, medical practices respond to the source of 
hospital payments and the rules that govern them. Here, we study the impact of 
supplementary private health insurance within the DRG-based financing of French hospitals. 
We use differences between the public and private hospital sectors in managers’ and doctors’ 
incentives (in terms of potential additional payments) and examine their effect on the practice 
of cesarean deliveries. We mobilize exhaustive delivery data from a French district over a 7-
year period (2008-2014) and consider factors that are known to influence obstetric practices. 
Our empirical results show that, although private hospitals are financed by a single public 
payer, like those in the public sector, they perform significantly more cesarean deliveries than 
public hospitals. This result is partially explained by additional payments covered by private 
health insurance and charged by private but not public hospitals.  
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1. Introduction 
Activity-based payment using diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) is now used in most 
developed countries. All French hospitals, public and private, are publicly paid through a 
DRG-based1 prospective payment system, introduced in 2008. Here, we investigate the 
impact of private health insurance on a hospital healthcare system where both public and 
private sectors are publicly, and apparently similarly, funded. 
What we are looking at in this study is appropriateness of cesarean deliveries. Like previous 
papers on cost efficiency and hospital performance (Hafsteinsdottir and Siciliani, 2010), we 
examine the argument of efficiency. The literature, both theoretical and empirical, has 
examined the overall effect of activity-based payment. Although convincing theoretical 
arguments lead to expectations of hospital cost reductions and improved efficiency, the 
empirical evidence is inconclusive. The introduction of the DRG system was associated with 
positive effects on hospital efficiency in Finland (Linna, 1999), Portugal (Dismuke and Sena, 
1999), Norway (Biørn et al., 2003; Biørn et al., 2010), and Switzerland (Widmer, 2015), 
while no such effects were found for Germany (Herwartz and Strumann, 2014), Italy 
(Barbetta et al., 2007), Austria (Sommersguter-Reichmann, 2000), or the United States 
(Borden, 1988; Chern and Wan, 2000).  
In public hospitals, France has a model where hospitals are in competition but physicians are 
salaried. In private hospitals, both hospitals and their physicians are paid according to their 
level of activity, but also receive additional payments from private health insurance. This 
raises the questions of doctors' profit-oriented practices. Baker et al. (2014) examined the 
consequences of contractual or ownership relations between hospitals and physician practices, 
often described as vertical integration. They found that "an increase in the market share of 
hospitals with the tightest vertically integrated relationship with physicians — ownership of 
physician’s practices — is associated with higher hospital prices and spending." A systematic 
review examining the factors explaining the diversity of findings regarding hospital 
ownership and quality (Eggleston et al., 2008) reports that the diverse results in the hospital 
ownership literature can largely be explained by differences in institutional context, including 
differences across regions and markets, and over time. 
                                                
1 A specific DRG classification was set up in France. For simplicity's sake, the term "DRG" will be used as a 
generic term that includes the French classification. 
3 
 
Most empirical work on the effect of reimbursement rules on healthcare production uses U.S. 
data (see Sloan, 2000, for a review). However, the structure of the U.S. healthcare market 
makes it hard to disentangle the pure effect of hospital ownership from other institutional 
features such as the segmentation of insurance or payers and payment types (Lien et al., 
2008). In France, the national health insurance system (Sécurité Sociale) is a single-payer 
system that covers the entire population. Studying the French context usefully eliminates any 
concern about, on the supply side, different reimbursement schemes for different payers, 
negotiation between providers and payers, and cost-shifting behavior by providers, and on the 
demand side, financial access to hospitals.  
Controlling for relevant patient- and hospital-level characteristics, we find that private 
hospitals perform more cesarean deliveries than public-sector hospitals. This result is 
explained by the context. Both sectors are publicly funded, but in the private sector both 
institutions and doctors receive additional payment from private health insurance for charges 
that public hospitals are not allowed to bill. 
In the following section, we briefly outline the factors that determine the use of cesarean 
deliveries and the characteristics of French hospitals providing obstetric services. The third 
section describes the data used for this study and offers some preliminary statistics. The 
econometric strategy is presented in the fourth section, and the results and robustness checks 
are reported in the fifth. In the sixth, we discuss the results and conclude. 
2. Cesarean delivery and the French healthcare system 
2.1. Use of cesarean deliveries 
Cesarean delivery is one of the most common surgical operations around the world (Gibbons 
et al., 2012). Epidemiologic studies show a negative association between cesarean rates and 
maternal, neonatal, and infant morbidity and mortality (Althabe et al., 2006; Villar et al., 
2007). This type of delivery may provide psychological and social well-being (Mazzoni et al., 
2011). However, it can also cause significant and sometimes permanent complications, 
disability, or death (Hyde and Modi, 2012; Souza et al., 2010). It is also associated with a 
higher cost (Allen et al., 2005; Rogers et al., 2017). It should thus be undertaken only when 
medically necessary. The research literature identifies many interrelated factors that influence 
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the number of cesarean deliveries. These are related to the characteristics of women, medical 
staff, and hospitals. 
Women’s characteristics explain cesarean deliveries in part. Older women and those having 
their first child have a higher probability of cesarean deliveries (Cleary R et al., 1996; Ecker 
et al., 2001). The presence of some medical risk factors for the woman and/or her fetus, which 
may arise from conditions that existed before pregnancy (e.g., chronic diseases), or develop 
during pregnancy (e.g., eclampsia), or labor (e.g., dystocia), are associated with more frequent 
cesarean births (Menacker et al., 2006; Penn and Ghaem-Maghami, 2001). Further, women of 
lower socioeconomic status have a higher probability of cesarean delivery than their more 
socioeconomically advantaged counterparts, at least in high-income countries (Linton et al., 
2004; Milcent and Zbiri, 2018), the choice of the woman herself may also be a factor 
(Mazzoni et al., 2011).  
The apparent increased use of "defensive medicine" in obstetrics is likely to contribute to the 
increase in cesarean deliveries. Many studies find a positive correlation between higher 
cesarean rates and the increase in obstetricians’ perceived risk of complaints and litigation 
(Fuglenes et al., 2009) or in their malpractice insurance premiums (Dubay et al., 1999; Yang 
et al., 2009).  
The time required for a cesarean is relatively stable while the time required for a vaginal 
delivery is unpredictable. Cesarean deliveries thus make it easier to manage medical 
equipment and facilities as well as physicians' time. Analyses show that the probability of a 
cesarean delivery increases sharply on Friday evenings and decreases during the weekend as 
physicians factor their time off into their medical practices (Brown, 1996; Fabbri, 2008).  
Heterogeneity of delivery practices may also be explained in part by hospital characteristics. 
Studies report an increased likelihood of cesarean deliveries for highly-equipped hospitals (Le 
Ray et al., 2006), as well as for teaching hospitals (Hammond, 2015). Hospital organization 
also plays a role: The probability of a cesarean delivery is lower in hospitals where 
obstetricians are more available (Yee et al., 2017). The size of the maternity unit also affects 
the probability of cesarean delivery in various ways (Roman et al., 2008; David et al., 2001). 
Staff organization in hospitals also has an impact (Zbiri et al., 2018).  
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Finally, reimbursement rules affect the cesarean delivery rate. Gruber and Owings (1996) 
report that, after a drop in the birth rate in some U.S. states, the number of cesarean deliveries 
increased. Gruber et al. (1999) show that a significant pay gap between a cesarean and a 
vaginal delivery accounts for half of the differences in practices in the U.S. Using the data 
from Gruber et al., Grant (2009) confirms the effect of physicians’ financial incentives on 
cesarean rates. In France, Milcent and Rochut (2009), using data from before implementation 
of the activity-based payment, show that private for-profit hospitals performed substantially 
more cesarean deliveries than public sector hospitals. This disparity was attributed to the 
difference in hospital payment systems. This context has changed: all French hospitals are 
now governed by the same reimbursement rules for all acute care stays, including for 
childbirth.  
2.2. Hospital sector and obstetric care in France 
In the French hospital healthcare system, there is a single payer: the national health insurance 
funds (Sécurité Sociale). The public system sets its own fee schedule. Computation of its fees 
include some costs, such as doctors' salaries, that are absent for the private sector.2 As a result, 
there are two fee scales according to sector, presumably close to equivalent after the private 
obstetrician bills the patient separately for his or her services. Table 1 presents the fee as a 
function of the hospital sector, for the first and last years of the study period. We observe that 
the mean DRG fee for delivery is around 2,500 Euros. The fee is around 40% higher for a 
cesarean than a vaginal delivery, and the difference in their fees is quite similar regardless of 
sector. Hence, the same financial incentives govern the provision of childbirth services in 
both sectors.  
On the patient side, all households are compulsorily enrolled in this public health insurance, 
which is financed by deductions (or for the self-employed, mandatory contributions) of a 
percentage of income. In-patient obstetric services (delivery) are reimbursed at 100% of the 
fee, regardless of hospital sector. For those few people not otherwise covered because no one 
in the household is working, a special fund of the public health insurance system ensures 
equivalent 100% coverage for childbirth. Therefore, the healthcare reimbursement for 
admittance in both public and private hospitals comes from this single public health insurer. 
                                                
2 In the public sector, the doctor’s wages are based on the civil servant grid, while in the private sector, 
independent physicians work on a fee-for-service basis, charging their patients directly. 
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Nonetheless, the situation is somewhat more complex. Only in private hospitals, patients can 
be charged additional fees for: (1) room and board, and (2) physicians' fees. Private 
supplementary health insurance reimburses most of these additional fees, and 95% of the 
French population has such private insurance (Ministry of Health, 2016).  
The room and board fees may be substantial in private hospitals. They are around 60 to 100 
Euros for a one-night stay and may thus encourage medical practices that maximize length of 
stay. Cesareans require longer hospitalizations than vaginal deliveries. A private hospital thus 
has an additional incentive to perform more cesarean deliveries.  
Hospital sector also affects physicians' income. In France, physicians including obstetricians 
can split time between activities in the private sector and activities in the public sector. In the 
public sector, hospitals compete both within and across sectors. On the other hand, medical 
staff and doctors are salaried. Their volume of work activity does not affect their income. As a 
result, the doctor’s choice of procedure is not influenced by income considerations. The 
doctor is a brake on the push to volumes. In the private sector, physicians bill mainly on a fee-
for-service basis. They receive their payment from the institution as well as from the woman 
herself via additional fees. For this payment, a requirement is the presence of the physician 
during the delivery process. The supplementary fees vary from 50 to 2,700 Euros, and 
average from 200 to 300 Euros for a vaginal delivery and from 500 to 600 Euros for a 
cesarean delivery. For anesthetists, it is about 200 Euros.3 As in the U.S., both the doctor and 
the hospital administration in the French private sector have incentives to increase the volume 
of cesareans. 
Besides, in public hospitals, women cannot choose their physician. The woman is assigned to 
a hospital but not to one obstetrician. During her pregnancy, a woman may see different 
physicians or even only or mainly midwives for her prenatal care visits. In a private hospital, 
however, she chooses a specific obstetrician who generally sees her for all of her prenatal care 
and delivery. The patient-physician relationship is thus closer, which increases the likelihood 
that the obstetrician will satisfy the woman's requests for delivery. Moreover, their ability to 
control their schedule (and keep evenings and weekends free) provides further incentives for 
cesarean birth for obstetricians at private hospitals. 
                                                
3 Unpublished mutual insurance data from 2011, the only known reference in France.  
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Obstetricians are also more likely to practice defensive medicine, and cesarean deliveries may 
reduce malpractice liability because they reduce the risk of complications during delivery. 
More important, physicians at public hospitals are covered by the hospitals' malpractice 
liability insurance, while independent physicians in private hospitals must purchase their own 
malpractice insurance that is about 30,000 Euros per year for a full-time private sector 
activity’s physician. This may be an incentive to perform more planned cesarean deliveries, in 
which the medical risk is lowest, and during a labor’s complication, they are incited to turn on 
a cesarean act.  
3. Data and preliminary statistics 
We use exclusive French data that allow us to consider the factors that influence cesarean 
deliveries, including i) the woman's age and medical risk factors, ii) her household's 
socioeconomic situation, iii) hospital characteristics, including sector and the organization of 
the maternity unit. 
3.1. Exhaustive delivery data 
We mobilize data from deliveries in 2008 through 2014 from two databases. One database 
contains all deliveries in the Yvelines administrative district. The second database contains 
information about all French hospitals. 
The first database comes from the first health certificate (Premier Certificat de Santé, PCS) of 
infants born in the district. In France, the PCS certificate is completed for each newborn 
before discharge from the maternity unit. In the Yvelines, it is supplemented by additional 
data concerning topics such as household deprivation, severe morbidity, and delivery trauma. 
The PCS database contains demographic information about the woman: age and parity;4 
detailed information about her individual socioeconomic level and that of her partner: status 
of the couple, level of education, occupation, employment/labor force status, and location; 
information about the pregnancy: medical follow-up, hospital stays; information about the 
delivery: hospital, date, mode of delivery, and delivery procedures performed; and full 
information about maternal, fetal, and neonatal health: diagnoses and co-morbidities. The 
study includes all births in the Yvelines district during the complete calendar years from 2008 
through 2014, but excludes deliveries that are stillbirths, medically indicated terminations of 
                                                
4 Here, parity is the number of previous deliveries; nulliparous women are having their first child. 
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pregnancies, and births that occurred outside maternity units. The study sample thus 
comprises 102,236 deliveries, for 58,645 of which full socioeconomic data are available. 
Because this information on socioeconomic characteristics is quite important, we analyze all 
observations with complete socioeconomic data. However, as a robustness check, we also re-
estimated all our results with the full sample of all observations.5 We find similar results 
which rules out the suspicion of omitted observations effect. The PCS database is processed 
by the general council of Yvelines (Conseil départemental des Yvelines), in collaboration with 
the regional public health administration agency (Agence Régionale de Santé de l’Ile-de-
France), and the local perinatal network (Réseau Périnatal Maternités en Yvelines et 
Périnatalité Active, MYPA). All data used are reported to the French data protection authority 
(Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés, CNIL, number 1295794). The PCS 
certificate is completed, almost prospectively from birth, by midwives and physicians. The 
contents of the certificates are also double-checked to correct inaccurate and missing 
information. The information extracted is thus of high quality.  
The second database is the French annual statistics for hospitals (Statistique Annuelle des 
Etablissements de santé, SAE). This survey, conducted by the Ministry of Health, provides 
information on all hospitals including their status, equipment level, volume of activity, 
medical staff composition, and location. The information on hospitals with obstetric care in 
the Yvelines district was located, checked, and supplemented through data from the local 
perinatal network. 
3.2. Descriptive statistics  
3.2.1. The French district of Yvelines 
Yvelines is the eighth largest administrative district in France by population (French national 
institute of statistics (Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, INSEE), 
2008-2014 data). Table A1 presents the summary statistics for patient- and hospital-level 
characteristics of the women giving birth in the district in 2008-2014. Their mean age is 30.7 
years, and 43.1% of them are nulliparous. The most frequent medical risk factors for cesarean 
                                                
5 See more details on the robustness checks in Section 5.4. 
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delivery are induced labor, previous cesarean, and other obstetric pathology,6 which account, 
respectively, for 21.6%, 10.3%, and 7.1% of all women. 
The Yvelines district has some geographic disparities in its socioeconomic status. The eastern 
Yvelines is made up of middle-class and upper-class areas. The rest is composed of an 
extensive rural zone with sparsely distributed, high-income areas, and some quite low-income 
areas (INSEE, 2008-2014 data). In the model, we control for the rural/urban location of 
residents as well as the level of education and the type of occupation.  
All hospitals are located in an urban area: There are hospitals (public as private) in well-off 
areas and hospitals are in poor areas as a private hospital in a municipality with an income’s 
median of 16,000 Euros per year (compared to 20,000 Euros in the whole France territory 
(INSEE, 2008-2014 data)). As Table A1 shows, few women have no partner (2%). The 
majority of women (61.4%) have a post-secondary education.7 Most women and their partners 
work, 69.6% and 89.8%, respectively, versus 6.7% and 4.4% who are unemployed, and 
23.7% and 5.8% who are not in the labor force.8 Differences also exist in occupations. Both 
the women and their partners work most often in office, sales, and service occupations, 
respectively 55.2% and 40.1%, and in second place, as managers and in higher intellectual 
occupations, respectively 31% and 36.7%. 
The Yvelines administrative district is well served by healthcare facilities providing obstetric 
care. There are 11 hospitals with 5 public hospitals and 6 private hospitals. All private 
hospitals in the Yvelines are private for-profit hospitals. From 2008 through 2014, the number 
of deliveries is stable and it accounts for 13% of the annual number of deliveries on the whole 
France territory (SAE, 2008-2014 data). In this district, 66.4% of deliveries take place in 
public hospitals and 33.6% in private hospitals. The distribution of births by sector is similar 
to the nationwide distribution.9 Maternity units without special neonatal care (equipment level 
1, with the least equipment) account for 19.1% of deliveries, versus 39.6% and 41.3%, 
                                                
6 The "other obstetric pathology" variable includes the diagnoses and co-morbidities not already considered 
individually (previous cesarean, diabetes, hypertension, eclampsia, and preeclampsia, intrauterine growth 
restriction, and placental disorder are all individual variables), that is, for example, infection, premature rupture 
of membranes, obesity, or amniotic fluid abnormality. 
7 In contrast to those with some secondary school, women who completed secondary education have reached the 
final year of secondary school, whether or not they obtained the baccalaureate degree. 
8 Those not in the labor force include students, apprentices, homemakers, retirees, those on parental leave, and 
others neither working nor looking for work. 
9 In France, 66% and 34% of the deliveries were performed in public and private hospitals, respectively (SAE, 
2008-2014 data). 
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respectively, for hospitals with special and intensive neonatal care units. Moreover, university 
hospitals perform 37.5% of the deliveries in the district.  
The Yvelines district has an average cesarean rate of 23.9% for the study period, higher than 
the national rate of 20.3% during the same period (SAE, 2008-2014 data). The Yvelines 
cesarean rate is lower in the public (22.3%) than in the private sector (27.2%). From 2008 to 
2014, the overall rate is relatively stable. However, it decreases in public hospitals by 9.3% 
while it increases by 13.9% in private hospitals.  
3.2.2. Public versus private hospitals 
Population characteristics vary notably by hospital sector (Table A1). Women giving birth in 
private hospitals are older than those in public hospitals, 31.5 years versus 30.3 years. 
Nonetheless, public hospitals provide care for a population considered to be at higher risk 
than those in private hospitals. For example, 4.3% of women giving birth in public hospitals 
have diabetes versus 3.3% of those admitted to private hospitals.  
Similarly, the economic level of households affects the sector: the percentages of low-
educated, low-skilled, and non-working women are all higher in public than in private 
hospitals, respectively, 42.8% versus 30.5%, 60.4% versus 49.3%, and 32.8% versus 25.5%. 
The same disparities appear for the partners: in public hospitals, 55.7% and 11.7% of 
parturients' partners are, respectively, low-skilled and not working, compared with 39.3% and 
11.7%, in private hospitals.  
Comparing equipment level by sector, we observe that the majority of births in public 
hospitals take place in high-equipped maternity units with neonatal intensive care (62.2%), 
while in private hospitals women most often give birth in maternity units with special 
neonatal care (60%). Note that all hospitals with neonatal intensive care and all those that are 
teaching hospitals are public.10  
Finally, focusing on organizational factors, we see that public hospitals have a higher rate of 
births on non-working days including weekends and holidays than private hospitals, 27.9% 
versus 23.5%.  
                                                
10 In France, the hospitals with neonatal intensive care unit are all in the public sector. Moreover, any institution 
with an intensive care unit would be required to accept emergency cases, which might explain the absence of any 
private neonatal intensive care unit. 
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4. Econometric strategy 
The empirical analysis uses panel data to assess the effect of the hospital sector on the 
practice of cesarean deliveries. 
A simplified way of writing the basic model we set up is as follows: 
P (Y) = f (T, D, X, S, W, V, I, e) 
with Y equal to 1 if woman i in hospital j in year t has a cesarean. 
- Tt is a linear continuous time variable (trend), starting in 2008 (trend=0) and ending in 2014 
(trend=6); 
- Dijt is the set of variables of demographic characteristics for patient i in hospital j in year t: 
age and parity; 
- Xijt is the set of medical risk factors of woman i in hospital j in year t such that one of them 
justifies or favors performing a cesarean delivery: previous cesarean, diabetes, hypertension, 
eclampsia or preeclampsia (including HELLP syndrome), intrauterine growth restriction, 
placental disorder (including placenta previa, placenta accreta, and abruptio placenta), other 
obstetric pathology (such as obesity, infection, premature rupture of membranes, amniotic 
fluid abnormality, or congenital anomaly), multiple pregnancy, preterm delivery (gestational 
age < 37 weeks), post-term delivery (gestational age > 41 weeks), fetal breech presentation or 
transverse lie, induced labor, low birth weight (< 2500 grams), and high birth weight (> 4000 
grams); 
- Sijt is the set of variables for socioeconomic characteristics for patient i in hospital j in year t: 
status of the couple, level of education, type of occupation, and work status of the woman, 
and her partner's type of occupation and work status, and rural woman’s location; 
- Wjt is the set of hospital type variables for hospital j in year t: sector, equipment level, and 
university status; 
- Vijt is the set of variables concerning hospital organization: the 24-hour availability of 
obstetricians for hospital j in year t, the day of delivery for woman i in hospital j in year t, the 
size of the unit based on the volume of deliveries of hospital j in year t, and the numbers of 
12 
 
midwives, of obstetricians, and of anesthetists working at hospital j in year t, as measured by 
full-time equivalent (FTE) employees per occupied patient bed;11 
- Iijt is a vector of the dummy variables for a private supplementary insurance covering 
additional payment for obstetric acts contracted by the woman i in hospital j in year t. We do 
not have the individual information on the private supplementary insurance coverage. We 
then use the macro information as given by the Ministry of Health and based on the 
employment status. For each status of employment, we use the weighting set up by the 
Ministry of Health. The high coverage is defined as a weighting of private health insurance 
higher or equal to 0.9 and inversely the low coverage for a weighting of private health 
insurance lower than 0.9 (Table 2). When the woman is less covered by her private insurance 
than her partner, she can be the beneficiary of her partner. Therefore, the private insurance 
coverage of her partner is also considered. We therefore have 4 dummy variables including 
the 4 possible situations of coverage by private supplementary insurance: a high probability of 
coverage for the woman and for her partner, a low probability of coverage for the woman and 
her partner, a high probability of coverage for the woman and a low probability for her 
partner, and the reverse situation, a low probability of coverage for the woman and a high for 
her partner. 
- eijt is the error term. 
[Insert Table 2] 
We use hierarchical data: patients grouped by their hospitals. We estimate multilevel logit 
models with the robust variance that takes the lack of independence between observations at 
the hospital level into account. The Hausman specification test between the specifications of 
the hospital fixed-effects and the hospital random-effects results in accepting the null 
hypothesis (p-value > 0.10). The hospital random-effects model thus produces consistent and 
                                                
11 The amount of time independent private practitioners spend on their hospital practice is not known. As a result, 
we suggest that part-time private practice doctors work 50% of the time at the hospital, and thus represent 50% 
of a FTE. This standard assumption is widely used (Clark and Milcent, 2011; Zbiri et al., 2018). While this is 
perhaps reasonable, we also check that all our results are robust to the more extreme assumptions of 25% and 
75% of a FTE (see Section 5.4). 
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efficient estimations: The hospital’s characteristics not explicitly taken into account in the 
model are not correlated with any independent variables.12 
We face a main estimation issue. The heterogeneity in preference is likely to affect the 
delivery act. As illustrated by Figure 1a, the intention-to-treat (ITT) depends on woman’s 
preference and physician’s preference that itself depends on woman’s clinical aspects, 
physician’s practice characteristics, risk’s aversion for malpractice, and financial incentives. 
Woman’s clinical aspects are related to physician’s practice characteristics and his risk 
aversion for avoidable complications (malpractice). Financial incentives depend on the Health 
Authorities reimbursement scheme that is equivalent for the public sector and the private 
sector. Besides, for private sector only, it depends on the supplementary insurance contract of 
the woman or her partner that may reimburse the additional payment (at least partially). 
Private supplementary insurance makes affordable an act by cesarean in reimbursing the 
additional payment in hospitals of the private sector. Woman’s preference also impacts the 
physician’s ITT. The main channel for woman to express her preference in delivery’s mode is 
the effect on the demand that is only true for the private sector. This demand is related to the 
supplementary private health insurance coverage that makes affordable the additional 
payment for cesarean act. As a consequence, the act’s choice is only partially impacted by the 
woman’s clinical aspects. For women with low clinical risk, the ITT by planned cesarean is 
more strongly associated to the private insurance than the ITT by unplanned delivery. 
[Insert Figure 1a]  
In this paper, we identify the supplementary insurance as an actor of the process of the 
treatment’s decision. To do so, we sequentially eliminate the non-financial incentive factors 
influencing the act performed by reducing the sample i) to the low clinical risk women 13and 
ii) to focus on the planned cesarean act (Figure 1b). As a result, the differences between 
sectors is attributed to financial incentives. A private supplementary insurance dummy 
measures the woman’s affordability for cesarean in the private sector. It measures the impact 
of the private insurance on the act’s decision. 
[Insert Figure 1b] 
                                                
12 We also use the hospital fixed-effects model as a robustness check. See more details in Section 5.4. 
13 The definition of the low risk subsample is based on the usual obstetrical literature (Coulm et al., 2012).   
. 
14 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Patient and hospital factors 
Table A2 in the Appendix reports the effects of the individual and hospital control variables 
on the probability of cesarean deliveries. Among the demographic characteristics, as 
expected, age and nulliparity increase this probability. Also as expected, well-known obstetric 
risk factors affect mode of delivery. Cesarean delivery is most prevalent for at-risk patients 
compared with those women who are at low risk. A non-vertex fetal presentation or 
transverse lie, previous cesarean, and placental disorder are the strongest risk factors.  
Socioeconomic characteristics that increase a woman's probability of cesarean birth include 
no postsecondary education, compared to more highly educated women. Similarly, women in 
low-skill jobs, such as manual workers, or office, sales, and service workers, or a middle-skill 
job, such as workers with intermediate occupations, are more likely to have a cesarean 
delivery than those with high-skill jobs, for instance, managerial or higher intellectual 
professionals. If the woman is unemployed, her probability of a cesarean delivery increases. 
Moreover, women not living with a partner are less likely to have a cesarean than women with 
a partner. The same is true for the partner's socioeconomic characteristics: low-skill 
occupations increase the probability of cesarean delivery, compared to high-skill professional 
positions. Accordingly, the probability of cesarean is higher for women whose partners are 
not in the labor force, compared with those who work. Besides, we control for rural versus 
urban location in column 2 of Table A2. Women living in rural areas have less probability of 
a cesarean than those living in urban areas at 9% significance level. In the following 
regression models, we suppress this variable because of the number of missing values 
(11.5%). Note that including this variable does not change the following results (available 
upon request). 
Hospital factors checked as control variables include neonatal equipment level; maternity 
units with neonatal care, versus those with no special neonatal care, have an increased 
probability of cesareans. Giving birth on a non-working day is negatively associated with 
cesarean delivery. Since many cesareans can be planned ahead, surgical deliveries are more 
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likely to take place on working days.14 Study of medical staffing levels shows that the more 
obstetricians per patient bed, the less likely a delivery by cesarean. 
In summary, different individual and institutional characteristics are significant indicators of 
cesarean deliveries. Our results are in accordance with the findings from the literature.15  
Moreover, we tested for a linear time trend for the seven-year period to identify any patterns 
of incidence for cesarean deliveries over the 2008-2014 period. Taking into account all the 
factors, we observe a non-significant global trend. 
Table 3 presents the effects of hospital sector on women’s probability of cesarean delivery. 
Column 1 of Table 3 shows that, after controlling for age, parity, and medical risk factors, 
admission to a private, compared with public, hospital increases the probability of cesarean 
delivery. Next, in addition to these epidemiologic factors, we consider socioeconomic factors 
in column 2 and find that private hospitals still have a higher rate of cesarean deliveries. In 
column 3, we also control for the hospital’s type and organization and show that, all else 
being equal, giving birth in a private hospital substantially increases the probability of 
cesarean delivery. Computing the odds ratio, we find that the probability of cesarean delivery 
rises by 79% in a private versus a public hospital (odds ratio = 1.79, 95%CI = [1.29-2.49]).16 
However, this hospital sector effect may capture other determinants as described above. 
[Insert Table 3] 
5.2. Impact of financial incentives 
A cesarean birth may cause increased and perhaps unnecessary morbidity to a woman, as it is 
major surgery. However, obstetricians may be protecting themselves from malpractice 
litigation. When a woman has a medical risk factor, a cesarean can be a defensive act to 
prevent complications during delivery. The physician’s practice characteristics leading to 
perform cesarean versus complicated vaginal delivery are on stake. Some physicians are 
particularly good to perform a cesarean with very low medical mark and others are 
specifically qualified to perform a complicated and hazardous vaginal delivery. Therefore, 
                                                
14 When we focus only on unplanned deliveries, the effect of delivering on a non-working day is no longer 
significant. Results are available upon request. 
15 As shown above in more details in Section 2.1. 
16 The previous literature shows similar private/public hospital differences in magnitude (Lutomski et al., 
2014;Salvador et al., 2009). 
. 
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physician’s practice characteristics and defensive medicine cannot be disentangled. This 
question of defensive medicine choice as well as physician’s practice characteristics does not 
come into play for women at low risk, or very marginally. When we compute the effect of 
hospital sector on the cesarean rate using each of the two subsamples thus defined and 
compare the results, we capture behavior due to self-protection against malpractice liability. 
Table 4 presents the sector effect on the use of cesarean deliveries for both the high and low 
medical risk subgroups, in columns 1 and 3, respectively. The high medical risk subgroup 
includes all women with at least one medical risk factor while the low medical risk subgroup 
only includes women without any medical risk factor. This low risk set of variables mixes 
clinical risk factors during the pregnancy and clinical risk factors during the delivery process. 
Regardless of other observed factors and of woman’s degree of risk, private hospitals perform 
more cesarean deliveries than public hospitals do. According to Figure 1b, for women with 
low clinical risk, here, we capture woman’s preference and physician’s financial incentive 
that are only present in the private sector. This finding confirms that the additional fees in the 
private sector (based on the additional room and board payment and the physicians’ additional 
fees) associated with woman’s preference plays on the disparity we observe in the mode of 
delivery between the two sectors.  
Actually, in the subsamples considered here, the treatment is the result of two different 
intention-to-treats (Figure 1a): by planned cesarean or unplanned delivery. As previously 
explained, the physician is less respondent to the financial incentive when his ITT is 
unplanned delivery. Indeed, the additional payment implies the presence of the physician 
during the delivery process that is only guaranteed with a planned cesarean. Moreover, they 
may have some unobserved factors (by the econometrician) popping up during the unplanned 
delivery process (extreme stress of the woman, operating staff not straight away available …) 
that play in the decision to perform a cesarean as an emergency act. As a consequence, we 
now focus on ITT by planned cesarean. 
The ITT is probably influenced by sector’ differences. In private hospitals, a woman chooses 
her own obstetrician, who will provide her prenatal care and be present for her child's birth. 
The relationship between the patient and the obstetrician is accordingly closer than in a public 
hospital where women do not see the same physician continuously throughout pregnancy. We 
assume that if the woman has a preference for a cesarean delivery, the obstetrician will plan 
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it,17 and the woman will be ready to pay for it. Indeed, in this planned cesarean context, the 
woman knows in advance that the delivery act in a for-profit hospital implies addition 
payment and the amount of the out-of pocket based on her supplementary insurance package. 
On the other hand, the obstetrician may prefer a cesarean rather than a normal delivery based 
on factors as given in Figure 1a. Their close relationship with their patients may allow them to 
convince these women. The financial incentive is then very strong because it is based on the 
combination (women’s preference, physician’s preference). This combination can be 
expressed all the more so as the supplementary insurance package is advantageous. We then 
assess the impact of the supplementary insurance for hospitals in the private sector. In order to 
rule out the clinical risk determinants, we restrict the sample to the women with low clinical 
risk.  
After adjusting for all variables including epidemiologic, socioeconomic, institutional, and 
organizational factors, we find that the hospital sector remains an independent factor for 
cesarean delivery (column 1 of Table 5).  
These results highlight the financial incentive impact on the delivery act preformed. Whatever 
the private insurance package, we show an effect of hospital sector on cesarean deliveries. 
This finding shows that, besides the effect of the other potential factors, the compensation 
scheme matters strongly in procedure choice.  
What about the unplanned cesarean delivery? Theoretically, a weak effect of the financial 
incentive is expected. Indeed, the ITT was to go to unplanned delivery. Then, the physician is 
not certain of his presence at the date of the delivery that is conditional to the additional 
payment. As before, we then restrict the sample to the women with low clinical risk i.e. 
women for whom defensive medicine is a marginal factor and we suppress the planned 
cesarean cases. Therefore, we focus on the urgent cesareans and we render marginal the 
clinical reasons of urgent cesareans. Holding all other covariates constant, we find a 
significant hospital sector effect (Column 3 of Table 5). However, this sector impact is much 
lower than the one found for planned cesarean deliveries as theoretically excepted: for the 
unplanned cesareans and women with low medical risk, the odds ratio of the sector variable is 
1.61 (95%CI = [1.37-1.90]) whereas for planned cesareans group, the odd ratio is of 4.86 
(95%CI = [2.77-8.51]). 
                                                
17 The data available here do not allow us to know the woman’s preference. This assumption seems reasonable to 
us.  
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Here, there is no reason to believe that the obstetrician is present at the cesarean delivery 
moment. We thus cannot interpret the difference in the mode of delivery between the public 
sector and the private sector only as a financial incentive impact of the physicians. It can be 
organizational factors regarding emergency situations. For instance, the nighttime, the 
medical staff may be not enough for dealing with popping up unexpected factors unobserved 
by the econometrician.  
As a general result, there is no overall effect of the private insurance. The only effect is 
through the admittance in hospitals of the private sector. This result emphasizes the link 
between private insurance and private sector in terms of accessibility for women and financial 
incentive for private providers (Tables 4 and 5).  
5.3. Supplementary private health insurance 
Having shown the financial incentive impact, we now turn on the woman’s affordability 
impact on this financial incentive.  
If the underlying explanation for the higher rate of cesarean deliveries in private compared 
with public hospitals is partially due to private supplementary health insurance, this higher 
rate should differ according to the private insurance status of the woman. Focusing on the 
effects of the private insurance coverage in the private sector on cesarean delivery for low 
clinical risk women, we show that the level of coverage impacts the cesarean rate (Table 4). 
Indeed, in term of supplementary private insurance, comparing the coefficient estimates 
between women with a high coverage and those with a low coverage, we find a significant 
difference at the level of 9% (column 4 of Table 4, Chi-square test = 2.78, p-value = 0.09). As 
a result, the more probability of private insurance coverage, the more probability of cesarean. 
On contrary, when we focus on the subsample of women with high clinical risk, we observe 
no difference in the probability of having a cesarean between women with a higher versus a 
lower probability of private supplementary insurance (column 2 of Table 4, Chi-square test = 
1.53, p-value = 0.22). 
As a result, for woman without clinical risk factors, private supplementary health insurance 
impacts the probability to be delivered by cesarean. We find that the probability of cesarean 
delivery for woman with low clinical risk rises by 98% for those with a higher probability of 
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supplementary insurance in a private hospital compared to those with a supplementary 
insurance in a public hospital (odds ratio = 1.98, 95%CI = [1.48-2.61]).  
However, we may argue that the significant level of the private supplementary health 
insurance effect is high for the two sub-groups. As said below, this sample deals with two 
ITTs that may impact the result.  
 [Insert Table 4] 
ITT planned cesarean delivery 
For women without a supplementary insurance contract, the impact of hospital sector is 
significantly much lower than for those with a supplementary insurance contract at 5% 
significance level (column 2 of Table 5, Chi-square test = 4.06, p-value = 0.04). That is, at the 
significant level of 5%, compared with women or their partner having a high probability of 
private supplementary insurance (odds ratio from 4.18 to 4.79, 95%CI from 1.91 to 10.78), 
there is a gap in the difference in the cesarean rates between sectors for women who barely 
can afford to pay for a cesarean delivery and lack insurance for it - and only for them (odds 
ratio = 2.33, 95%CI = [0.94-5.79]) (see columns 2 and 3 of Table 5).   
ITT unplanned delivery 
We explore the effect of the woman’s affordability on the financial incentive by assessing the 
impact of the supplementary insurance for hospitals in private sector (Column 4 of Table 5). 
We observe no difference in the probability of having a cesarean between women with a 
higher versus a lower probability of private supplementary insurance (Chi-square test = 0.20, 
p-value = 0.66). We conclude that the woman’s preference at the heat of the moment that may 
affect the decision is independent of any private insurance coverage reasons. As well, 
physician’s preference does not depend on the woman’s private insurance coverage. 
[Insert Table 5] 
5.4. Robustness checks 
In this paper, we control for unobservable hospital heterogeneity by using hospital random- 
effects. As previously explained, the Hausman test validated this econometric approach. As a 
sensitivity analysis, we look for the sector’s effect (variable of interest) when using a hospital 
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fixed-effects. A strict collinearity exists between the hospital fixed-effects and the invariant 
explanatory variables at the hospital level. We therefore use a two-step fixed-effects model. 
Clustered standard errors of the second stage are estimated by bootstrap due to the use of an 
estimated dependent variable. The results using the hospital fixed-effects specification are 
very similar to the previous findings based on hospital random-effects specification (Table 
A3). 
Second, our dataset covers the entire population of women who gave birth in the Yvelines 
over the period of 2008-2014. Because household socioeconomic information is not available 
for all observations, the analyses we present use all observations with complete 
socioeconomic data that enable us to control for all socioeconomic characteristics. To verify 
the lack of bias of this sample, we re-estimate all the models by using the full set of 
observations without taking socioeconomic information into account. The results, using 
hospital random- or fixed-effects, are similar to those based on our main sample (Table A4). 
The descriptive analysis further supports this finding that the distribution for the variables in 
the whole population and the main sample of analysis are almost identical.  
Third, we may argue that to assess the financial incentive impact, we may compare the 
planned cesareans with the normal deliveries, suppressing the urgent cesareans. Doing so 
implies to introduce a bias in the results. Indeed, any urgent cesarean can be an obstetrician’s 
decision based on financial incentives or on a popping up unexpected factor unobserved by 
the econometrician. As a robustness test, we run the model on the subsample including 
planned cesareans and normal deliveries. Results are presented in Table A5. As can be 
checked, the results are on the same line.  
Fourth, the cut-off of the definition of the high probability of private health insurance used 
(0.9) is arbitrary. However, we run the models with cut-offs of 0.85, of 0.80, and of 0.75. The 
results are unchanged (available upon request). One limit of this paper is that we do not have 
the individual information on the private health insurance coverage. Since the French 
organization of the health insurance market is highly connected with the professional status, 
we believe that the medical staff assumes that the woman is covered by a supplementary 
private health insurance (overall, 95% of the population is covered by a supplementary private 
insurance). The supplier’s behavior is driven by the financial incentive. In this paper, we 
underestimate the percent of woman having a supplementary private health insurance. A 
private insurance coverage is the standard case for 95% of the population and a no private 
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insurance coverage is the exception. As a result, we underestimate the effect of the 
supplementary private health insurance effect on the financial incentive impact.  
Lastly, to treat the heterogeneity between public and private hospitals concerning information 
about hospital staff, we consider an average situation in which independent physicians 
working part-time devote 50% of their time to their hospital work. To verify that this 
hypothetical weighting does not affect our results, we test two extreme cases: a so-called 
minimal level of work in which they devote only 25% of their time to the hospital and a so-
called maximal level of work, obtained by applying a coefficient of 0.75 to the total. These 
25% and 75% extreme weightings for hospital work time of private physicians produce 
results similar to those based on the average weighting (Full tables of results are upon 
request).  
6. Conclusion 
As a conclusion, the additional fees in the private sector are a real financial incentive to 
perform planned cesarean deliveries and may therefore explain part of the disparity we 
observe in the mode of delivery between the two sectors.  
Different characteristics of the healthcare market may drive costly health behaviors. One of 
them is the hospitals' mode of financing. Payments to hospitals may result in financial 
incentives that may encourage healthcare providers, including hospitals and the physicians 
they employ, to perform some medical interventions rather than others. Most developed 
countries have recently adopted activity-based payment systems for the purpose of improving 
hospital efficiency as well as the quality and effectiveness of care. However, empirical 
evidence is scarce, except from the U.S. 
Cesarean deliveries are among the most common surgical procedures and absorb large 
quantities of healthcare resources annually. They are also one of the medical practices studied 
most by economists because they are potentially responsive to a variety of economic forces 
including source of payment and financial incentives.  
This study used previously unexplored delivery data from a French district to examine the 
effect of hospital sector — private versus public — on utilization of cesarean deliveries, in the 
context of a unique single-payer healthcare finance system. The empirical analysis reveals 
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that, after controlling for a large number of determinants for individual- and hospital-level 
factors that may affect obstetric practices, the probability of a cesarean birth is higher in a 
private than a public hospital.  
Despite the apparent similarity of funding for the private and public hospital sectors under a 
unique payment system, private hospitals receive an additional payment from their patients 
for room and board, costs which are not reimbursed by the single-payer public health 
insurance. The fees are, however, covered by private supplementary health insurers that help 
make care affordable for all patients regardless of whether it is public or private, and whether 
the delivery is cesarean or vaginal. As a result, women’s preference for the mode of delivery 
act is not restrained by financial accessibility. But private supplementary health insurers 
disturb the public regulation set up by the reimbursement system of the single-payer public 
health insurance system. Specifically, the private health insurance affects medical practices in 
a market-driven public healthcare delivery system, including by creating incentives for 
harmful practices. These private health insurance policies and choices may affect or prevent 
the implementation of public policies developed by policy makers for the welfare of the 
society.  
This result may be applicable abroad to other healthcare systems, for instance, the 
development of private medical insurance in addition to the National Health Service and 
Medigap policies in addition to classic Medicare. These forms of public healthcare funding, 
whether they are intended for all (France, U.K.) or for some (Medicare in the U.S.), have been 
set up with the objective of addressing inequity in access to healthcare. However, the 
development of the portion of medical care supported by supplementary private health 
insurance may impair this social goal of equity.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1a. Identification process from the intention-to-treat to the delivery act 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1b. Identification process of the financial incentives on the intention-to-treat by (un)planned 
cesarean act 
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• Financial	incentives	for	physicians	in	private	sector	-	Woman’s	preference	for	cesarean	when	emergency	
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Tables 
 
Table 1. DRG fees for stays including childbirth by hospital sector.  
 
2008      2014    
  Public Private  Public  Private 
No complication      
  Vaginal delivery (Euros)   2,164 1,450  2,439/2,054 1,490/1,282   
  Cesarean delivery (Euros)  2,983 1,789  2,812      1,759 
  Difference (%)  +38% +23%  +15%/+36 % +15%/+37% 
Minor complication     
  Vaginal delivery (Euros)  2,615 1,631  2,900/2,336   1,669/1,435                             
  Cesarean delivery (Euros)  4,208 2,202  4,153     2,891 
  Difference (%)                      +61% +35%      +43%/+77%     +73%/+101%   
Major complication     
  Vaginal delivery (Euros)  3,347 1,803  3,071/2,615 1,803/1,617 
  Cesarean delivery (Euros)  4,900 2,346  4,383      2,967 
  Difference (%)  +46% +30%  +43%/+67% +65%/+83% 
 
Note: Stays presented are those for singleton deliveries. For 2014, fees vary between nulliparous and multiparous women 
who deliver vaginally and are reported in that order. 
Data source: French technical agency for hospital information (the Agence Technique de l’Information sur l’Hospitalisation, 
ATIH), 2008-2014. 
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Table 2. Rates of coverage by supplementary private insurance according to the employment status.  
 
 Overall rate Rate excluding CMU-C  
 
High coverage  
Working people 96% 94% 
(including those on parental leave) 
 
Retirees 95% 94% 
 
Students and apprentices 95% 92% 
 
Low coverage  
Homemakers 91% 71% 
 
Unemployed people 86% 61% 
 
Other people neither working nor looking for work 86% 73% 
 
 
Note: For the poorest, they can be covered by a public supplementary insurance playing an equivalent role as a private 
supplementary insurance, named CMU-C. However, this public supplementary insurance does not cover extra-cost defined 
here for cesarean in a private hospital. Therefore, we use the coverage's rate excluding CMU-C to create the private 
supplementary insurance variable (Iijt). 
Data source: French Ministry of Health (the Ministère de la Santé, DREES), 2012. 
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Table 3. Effects of hospital sector on cesarean deliveries. Multilevel logit models (coefficient 
estimates).  
 
       
     1  2  3   
  
 
Time 
Trend     0.003  0.002  0.001   
     (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.013)   
  
 
Hospital sector 
Private      0.418***  0.460***  0.582***   
     (0.117)  (0.120)  (0.168)   
  
 
Demographic control variables  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Medical control variables   Yes  Yes  Yes    
Socioeconomic control variables  No  Yes  Yes  
Hospital control variables   No  No  Yes   
 
 
Observations (N)    58,645  58,645  58,645   
     
 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the hospital level in parentheses. *** = 1% significance level, ** = 5%, * = 10%. 
All regressions use the main sample with complete socioeconomic data. Control variables include for demographics: age and 
parity; for medical risk factors: previous cesarean, diabetes, hypertension, eclampsia or preeclampsia, fetal growth restriction, 
placental disorder, other obstetric pathology, plurality, term at delivery, fetal presentation, induced labor, and birth weight; 
for socioeconomic status: woman’s status of the couple, education, occupation, and work status, and her partner’s occupation 
and work status; and for hospital characteristics: equipment level, teaching status, obstetrician availability, day of delivery, 
size, and numbers of full-time midwives, obstetricians, and anesthetists per occupied bed.  
Data source: PCS, SAE, Yvelines district (France), 2008-2014. 
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Table 4. Effects of hospital sector on cesarean deliveries, for different medical severity subgroups. 
Multilevel logit models (coefficient estimates).  
 
       
 High medical risk  Low medical risk  
  
 1 2 3 4 
  
 
Time 
Trend -0.001 -0.001 0.006 0.006 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) 
  
Hospital sector 
Private  0.633***  0.677***  
 (0.167)  (0.145)  
 
Supplementary private health insurance 
 
High coverage (woman and her partner)   Reference   Reference  
 
High coverage (woman) and low coverage   0.123*    -0.352 
(partner)   (0.072)   (0.409) 
 
Low coverage (woman) and high coverage   -0.077    0.094 
(partner)   (0.063)   (0.154) 
 
Low coverage (woman and her partner)   0.018    -0.143 
   (0.175)   (0.199) 
 
Crossed variables for hospital sector and supplementary private health insurance 
 
Private x High coverage (woman and her    0.615***   0.683*** 
partner)   (0.170)   (0.149) 
 
Private x High coverage (woman) and low    0.593**   0.613* 
coverage (partner)   (0.254)   (0.325) 
 
Private x Low coverage (woman) and high    0.754***   0.657*** 
coverage (partner)   (0.170)   (0.169) 
 
Private x Low coverage (woman and her   1.080**   0.505** 
partner)   (0.430)   (0.200) 
  
 
Demographic control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Medical control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Socioeconomic control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hospital control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Observations (N) 28,312 28,312 30,333 30,333 
     
 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the hospital level in parentheses. *** = 1% significance level, ** = 5%, * = 10%. 
All regressions use the main sample with complete socioeconomic data. Control variables include for demographics: age and 
parity; for medical risk factors: previous cesarean, diabetes, hypertension, eclampsia or preeclampsia, fetal growth restriction, 
placental disorder, other obstetric pathology, plurality, term at delivery, fetal presentation, induced labor, and birth weight; 
for socioeconomic status: woman’s status of the couple, education, occupation, and work status, and her partner’s occupation 
and work status; and for hospital characteristics: equipment level, teaching status, obstetrician availability, day of delivery, 
size, and numbers of full-time midwives, obstetricians, and anesthetists per occupied bed.  
Data source: PCS, SAE, Yvelines district (France), 2008-2014. 
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Table 5. Effects of hospital sector on cesarean deliveries, for (un)planned cesareans. Multilevel logit 
models (coefficient estimates).  
 
       
      Planned cesareans  Unplanned cesareans
      for low medical risk  for low medical risk
      1  2  3  4 
  
 
Time 
Trend      0.041**  0.041**  -0.011  -0.011
      (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
  
Hospital sector 
Private       1.547***    0.477***  
      (0.284)    (0.084)   
 
Supplementary private health insurance 
 
High coverage (woman and her partner)   Reference   Reference     
High coverage (woman) and low coverage    -0.758    -0.220 
(partner)       (0.527)    (0.414)  
 
Low coverage (woman) and high coverage    -0.013    0.190 
(partner)       (0.143)    (0.229)  
 
Low coverage (woman and her partner)    -0.108    -0.089 
        (0.317)    (0.317)  
 
Crossed variables for hospital sector and supplementary private health insurance 
 
Private x High coverage (woman and her  1.566***    0.476***  
partner) (0.284)    (0.092)  
 
Private x High coverage (woman) and low  1.513***    0.494*  
coverage (partner) (0.441)    (0.299)  
 
Private x Low coverage (woman) and high  1.430***    0.472*** 
coverage (partner) (0.313)    (0.126)  
 
Private x Low coverage (woman and her 0.845*    0.551***  
partner) (0.465)    (0.151)  
  
 
Demographic control variables   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Medical control variables    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Socioeconomic control variables   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Hospital control variables    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
 
Observations (N)     30,333  30,333  29,088  29,088
     
 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the hospital level in parentheses. *** = 1% significance level, ** = 5%, * = 10%. 
All regressions use the main sample with complete socioeconomic data. Control variables include for demographics: age and 
parity; for medical risk factors: previous cesarean, diabetes, hypertension, eclampsia or preeclampsia, fetal growth restriction, 
placental disorder, other obstetric pathology, plurality, term at delivery, fetal presentation, induced labor, and birth weight; 
for socioeconomic status: woman’s status of the couple, education, occupation, and work status, and her partner’s occupation 
and work status; and for hospital characteristics: equipment level, teaching status, obstetrician availability, day of delivery, 
size, and numbers of full-time midwives, obstetricians, and anesthetists per occupied bed.  
Data source: PCS, SAE, Yvelines district (France), 2008-2014.  
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Table A1. Descriptive statistics. 
 
Full sample                                 Public                  Private             
 n Percent Percent Percent  
Outcome variable 
Cesarean delivery 102,236 23.93 22.28 27.20  
Woman’s demographics 
Age (years) 102,236 30.73 (5.14) 30.34 (5.22) 31.52 (4.87)  
Nulliparous 102,236 43.09 42.98 43.31  
Woman’s medical risk factors  
Previous cesarean 102,236 10.33 10.19 10.61  
Diabetes  102,236 3.96 4.28 3.31  
Hypertension  102,236  1.12 1.09 1.19  
Eclampsia or preeclampsia 102,236 0.81 1.01 0.41  
Fetal growth restriction 102,236  1.24 1.51 0.72  
Placental disorder  102,236 0.24 0.25 0.22  
Other obstetric pathology 102,236 7.13 7.99 5.44  
Multiple pregnancy 102,236 1.46 1.68 1.04  
Preterm delivery  102,236 5.04 5.81 3.51  
Post-term delivery  102,236 0.12 0.13 0.11  
Breech presentation or transversal lie 102,236 4.09 4.10 4.08  
Induced labor 102,236 21.58 21.86 21.03  
Low birth weight  102,236 5.48 6.43 3.62   
High birth weight  102,236 7.07 7.04 7.12  
Woman’s socioeconomic level      
No partner  100,411 2.03 2.44 1.24   
Education   
  Primary school  79,428 2.66 3.23 1.55  
  Some secondary school 79,428 13.99 16.03 10.06  
  Completed secondary school   79,428 21.96 23.54 18.93  
  College or university 79,428 61.39 57.19 69.46  
Occupation   
  Manual worker 70,201 1.35 1.69 0.72  
  Office, sales, or service staff 70,201 55.17 58.73 48.62  
  Farmer 70,201 0.32 0.34 0.28     
  Craft/trades worker or entrepreneur   70,201 2.94 2.60 3.57  
  Intermediate (technical) 70,201 9.22 10.57 6.74  
  Managerial or higher intellectual  70,201 31.00 26.07 40.07  
Work status    
  Working 83,351 69.64 67.21 74.58  
  Unemployed    83,351 6.65 7.05 5.86  
  Not in labor force   83,351 23.71 25.75 19.57  
Partner’s socioeconomic level 
Occupation   
  Manual worker 78,712 9.29 11.50 5.01  
  Office, sales, or service staff 78,712 40.12 43.16 34.25  
  Farmer 78,712 0.37 0.39 .32   
  Craft/trades worker or entrepreneur   78,712 7.33 7.10 .25  
  Intermediate (technical) 78,712 6.20 6.94 4.77  
  Managerial or higher intellectual  78,712   36.69 30.92 47.86  
Work status    
  Working  79,154   89.77 88.30 92.70  
  Unemployed  79,154 4.41 5.03 3.17  
  Not in labor force 79,154 5.82 6.67 4.12  
Woman’s location 
Rural  90,482 8.63 10.27 5.23 
Hospital type 
Private   102,236 33.64 - 33.64  
Level of equipment        
  No neonatology unit   102,236 19.11 8.54 39.96  
  Neonatology unit   102,236 39.64 29.30 60.04  
  Neonatal intensive care unit   102,236 41.25 62.16 -  
Teaching   102,236 37.49 56.50 -  
Hospital organization 
On-call obstetrician outside the unit 102,236 9.09 - 27.02  
Non-working day delivery    102,236 26.42 27.90 23.48  
35 
 
Size  
  Small (< 1000 deliveries/year) 102,236 11.60 4.92 24.78  
  Medium (1000-1999 deliveries/year) 102,236 31.86 20.13 54.99  
  Large (≥ 2000 deliveries/year) 102,236 56.54 74.95 20.23  
Midwives (FTEs/occupied bed) 102,236 1.10 (0.34) 1.28 (0.25) 0.74 (0.14)  
Obstetricians (FTEs/occupied bed) 102,236 0.35 (0.11) 0.32 (0.10) 0.40 (0.11)  
Anesthetists (FTEs/occupied bed) 102,236 0.39 (0.15) 0.41 (0.16) 0.36 (0.12)  
 
Note: Means are given with their standard deviation in parentheses for continuous variables. 
Data source: PCS, SAE, Yvelines district (France), 2008-2014. 
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Table A2. Effects of patient and hospital factors on cesarean deliveries. Multilevel logit models 
(coefficient estimates). 
 1 2 
Time   
Trend 0.001 0.000 
 (0.013) (0.014) 
Woman’s demographics   
Age (years) 0.054*** 0.055*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) 
Nulliparous 1.200*** 1.197*** 
 (0.074) (0.070) 
Woman’s medical risk factors   
Previous cesarean 3.071*** 3.049*** 
 (0.117) (0.107) 
Diabetes 0.235** 0.225** 
 (0.106) (0.103) 
Hypertension  0.511*** 0.480*** 
 (0.091) (0.090) 
Eclampsia or preeclampsia 1.295*** 1.343*** 
 (0.166) (0.154) 
Fetal growth restriction 0.775*** 0.789*** 
 (0.240) (0.229) 
Placental disorder 2.456*** 2.474*** 
 (0.313) (0.363) 
Other obstetric pathology 0.082*** 0.117*** 
 (0.025) (0.033) 
Multiple pregnancy 0.266 0.233 
 (0.187) (0.180) 
Preterm delivery 0.337*** 0.333*** 
 (0.095) (0.102) 
Post-term delivery 1.126*** 1.182*** 
 (0.198) (0.203) 
Breech presentation or transversal lie 3.515*** 3.529*** 
 (0.133) (0.128) 
Induced labor 0.136* 0.147* 
 (0.081) (0.077) 
Low birth weight 0.488*** 0.474*** 
 (0.054) (0.061) 
High birth weight 0.737*** 0.744*** 
 (0.090) (0.091) 
Woman’s socioeconomic level   
No partner -0.246** -0.257** 
 (0.099) (0.112) 
Primary school 0.207** 0.224** 
 (0.105) (0.108) 
Some secondary school 0.282*** 0.275*** 
 (0.048) (0.045) 
Completed secondary school 0.248*** 0.249*** 
 (0.032) (0.034) 
Manual worker 0.225*** 0.207** 
 (0.076) (0.085) 
Office, sales, or service staff 0.123*** 0.133*** 
 (0.038) (0.046) 
Farmer 0.238 0.189 
 (0.354) (0.411) 
Craft/trades worker or entrepreneur 0.101 0.076 
 (0.070) (0.073) 
Intermediate (technical) 0.121*** 0.114** 
 (0.046) (0.114) 
Unemployed 0.126** 0.134** 
 (0.057) (0.067) 
Not in labor force -0.057 -0.050 
 (0.044) (0.040) 
Partner’s socioeconomic level   
Manual worker 0.138*** 0.129*** 
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 (0.048) (0.044) 
Office, sales, or service staff 0.126*** 0.129*** 
 (0.029) (0.030) 
Farmer 0.034 0.121 
 (0.223) (0.284) 
Craft/trades worker or entrepreneur 0.089 0.067 
 (0.068) (0.078) 
Intermediate (technical) 0.066 0.066 
 (0.050) (0.057) 
Unemployed  0.007 0.019 
 (0.080) (0.089) 
Not in labor force 0.157*** 0.156*** 
 (0.042) (0.052) 
Woman’s location 
Rural  
  
-0.048* 
  (0.027) 
Hospital type   
Private  0.582*** 0.553*** 
 (0.168) (0.187) 
Neonatology unit 0.193** 0.223** 
 (0.087) (0.087) 
Neonatal intensive care unit 0.316* 0.361** 
 (0.180) (0.183) 
Teaching 0.116 0.109 
 (0.119) (0.130) 
Hospital organization   
On-call obstetrician outside the unit -0.036 -0.069 
 (0.097) (0.088) 
Non-working day delivery  -0.528*** -0.520*** 
 (0.049) (0.048) 
Small size (< 1000 deliveries/year)      0.112 0.192 
 (0.130) (0.122) 
Large size (≥ 2000 deliveries/year) 0.012 0.003 
 (0.027) (0.029) 
FTEs midwives (/occupied bed) -0.091 -0.110* 
 (0.082) (0.066) 
FTEs obstetricians (/occupied bed) -0.528*** -0.499** 
 (0.201) (0.195) 
FTEs anesthetists (/occupied bed) 0.003 0.057 
 (0.264) (0.308) 
Observations 58,645 52,927 
 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the hospital level in parentheses. *** = 1% significance level, ** = 5%, * = 10%. 
Data source: PCS, SAE, Yvelines district (France), 2008-2014. 
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Table A3. Effects of hospital sector on cesarean deliveries. Multilevel logit models (coefficient estimates). Hospital fixed-effects specification. 
 
       
                                                 1  2  3    4   5  
    All women High medical Low medical    Planned cesareans  Unplanned cesareans 
       risk  risk    for low medical risk for low medical risk  
 
 
Trend     0.019  0.024  0.005    0.002   0.001  
     (0.019)  (0.025)  (0.016)    (0.026)   (0.018)  
 
Private      0.736***  0.701***  0.812***    1.602***   0.458**  
     (0.223)  (0.258)  (0.247)    (0.401)   (0.217) 
 
 
Demographic control variables     Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes   Yes    
Medical control variables         Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes   Yes    
Socioeconomic control variables         Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes   Yes 
Hospital control variables          Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes   Yes 
 
 
Observations (N)           58,634  28,307  30,327    30,267   29,082   
     
 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the hospital level in parentheses. *** = 1% significance level, ** = 5%, * = 10%. All regressions use the main sample with complete socioeconomic 
data. Control variables include for demographics: age and parity; for medical risk factors: previous cesarean, diabetes, hypertension, eclampsia or preeclampsia, fetal growth restriction, placental 
disorder, other obstetric pathology, plurality, term at delivery, fetal presentation, induced labor, and birth weight; for socioeconomic status: woman’s status of the couple, education, occupation, 
and work status, and her partner’s occupation and work status; and for hospital characteristics: equipment level, teaching status, obstetrician availability, day of delivery, size, and numbers of 
midwives, obstetricians, and anesthetists per occupied bed.  
Data source: PCS, SAE, Yvelines district (France), 2008-2014. 
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Table A4. Effects of hospital sector on cesarean deliveries. Multilevel logit models (coefficient estimates). Full sample without adjustment on socioeconomic 
characteristics.  
 
       
                                                 Hospital random-effects specification    Hospital fixed-effects specification 
    1                         2  3    4  5  6  
    All women Low medical  Planned cesareans   All women Low medical Planned cesareans 
      risk  for Low medical risk    risk  for Low medical risk 
 
 
Trend     -0.001  -0.002  0.026**    0.005  -0.005  -0.006 
     (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.012)    (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.020) 
  
Private      0.426*  0.488**  1.216***    0.639**  0.706***  1.389***  
     (0.221)  (0.214)  (0.216)    (0.248)  (0.256)  (0.342)   
  
 
Demographic control variables     Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes   
Medical control variables         Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes   
Socioeconomic control variables         No  No  No    No  No  No   
Hospital control variables          Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes   
 
 
Observations (N)           102,236  53,242  53,242    102,236  53,242  51,094  
     
 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the hospital level in parentheses. *** = 1% significance level, ** = 5%, * = 10%. All regressions use the full sample with all observations. Control 
variables include for demographics: age and parity; for medical risk factors: previous cesarean, diabetes, hypertension, eclampsia or preeclampsia, fetal growth restriction, placental disorder, 
other obstetric pathology, plurality, term at delivery, fetal presentation, induced labor, and birth weight; for socioeconomic status: woman’s status of the couple, education, occupation, and work 
status, and her partner’s occupation and work status; and for hospital characteristics: equipment level, teaching status, obstetrician availability, day of delivery, size, and numbers of full-time 
midwives, obstetricians, and anesthetists per occupied bed.  
Data source: PCS, SAE, Yvelines district (France), 2008-2014.  
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Table A5. Effects of hospital sector on cesarean deliveries, for planned cesareans versus normal 
deliveries. Multilevel logit models (coefficient estimates).  
 
       
       Planned cesareans for low medical risk 
       1   2 
  
 
Time 
Trend       0.040**   0.040**  
       (0.019)   (0.019)   
 
Hospital sector 
Private        1.580***     
       (0.286)      
 
Supplementary private health insurance 
 
High coverage (woman and her partner)     Reference        
High coverage (woman) and low coverage      -0.800   
(partner)         (0.542)    
 
Low coverage (woman) and high coverage      0.018   
(partner)         (0.145)    
 
Low coverage (woman and her partner)      -0.129   
          (0.303)  
 
Crossed variables for hospital sector and supplementary private health insurance 
 
Private x High coverage (woman and her    1.600***   
partner)   (0.286)    
 
Private x High coverage (woman) and low    1.565***    
coverage (partner)   (0.457)    
 
Private x Low coverage (woman) and high    1.473***    
coverage (partner)   (0.319)    
 
Private x Low coverage (woman and her   0.864*    
partner)   (0.462)   
   
  
 
Demographic control variables    Yes   Yes   
Medical control variables     Yes   Yes   
Socioeconomic control variables    Yes   Yes   
Hospital control variables     Yes   Yes   
 
 
Observations (N)      28,003   28,003  
     
 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the hospital level in parentheses. *** = 1% significance level, ** = 5%, * = 10%. 
All regressions use the main sample with complete socioeconomic data. Control variables include for demographics: age and 
parity; for medical risk factors: previous cesarean, diabetes, hypertension, eclampsia or preeclampsia, fetal growth restriction, 
placental disorder, other obstetric pathology, plurality, term at delivery, fetal presentation, induced labor, and birth weight; 
for socioeconomic status: woman’s status of the couple, education, occupation, and work status, and her partner’s occupation 
and work status; and for hospital characteristics: equipment level, teaching status, obstetrician availability, day of delivery, 
size, and numbers of full-time midwives, obstetricians, and anesthetists per occupied bed.  
Data source: PCS, SAE, Yvelines district (France), 2008-2014.  
 
 
 
